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Abstract 
 
The student protests in South African Universities, which started 
in 2015, demanded the decolonisation of certain aspects of 
higher education. While the primary demand is free education, 
issues of the curriculum and transformation connected with the 
country's history of colonialism and apartheid have also 
surfaced. In the field of law, demands for curriculum change are 
accompanied by the broad issue of the decolonisation of law, 
translating into questions of legal history, the concept of law, the 
role of law in African societies, the status of indigenous systems 
of law in the post-independent/apartheid legal system, and how 
law is taught in law schools. 
This paper examines the idea of the decolonisation of law in 
relation to the teaching of law in African states previously under 
the influence of English or Roman-Dutch colonial/apartheid legal 
history. The teaching of law is with special reference to the 
system of law that governs the majority of people in Africa in 
private law and aspects of governance – living customary law. 
The paper examines the design of legal education with respect 
to three elements that are essential to the decolonisation of law 
and legal education. The elements under review are the 
inclusion of living customary law in legal education, a shift in the 
legal theoretical paradigm within which law is taught, and the 
interdisciplinary study of law. Thus, the paper links the 
decolonisation of law to how law is taught, with special reference 
to living customary law. In discussing these elements, the paper 
draws examples from the South African legal system, because 
it has the most advanced jurisprudential conceptualisation of 
customary law on the African Continent. 
Keywords 
Decolonisation of law; legal theory; teaching law; living 
customary law; interdisciplinary. 
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1 Introduction 
In 2015 South African universities witnessed a spate of protests under the 
banners of "Rhodes Must Fall" and "Fees Must Fall" and the broad issues 
of social justice and the transformation of universities from their colonial and 
Eurocentric heritages. These protests are likely to change the nature of 
tertiary institutions and teaching in these institutions in South Africa.1 With 
regard to legal studies, the protests included demands for changes in the 
curricula in law schools. In my view, implicit in this demand is a call for a re-
thinking of broader legal issues, such as the decolonisation of law, which in 
turn raises questions about the legal history of African countries; the 
concept of law; the role of law in African societies; the status of indigenous 
systems of law in post-independence or post-apartheid legal systems; and 
how law is taught in African law schools. This proposition is partially 
confirmed by the views of some law students. Alex Hotz, for example, wrote: 
"As a law student, I believe decolonising the law faculty goes beyond the 
faculty and the institution. It speaks to what the law is and how it is used 
within society."2 These demands have therefore kindled the need to reflect 
on these issues from different perspectives. 
The aim of this paper is to explore the idea of decolonisation and the 
teaching of law in African institutions of higher learning. It focuses on the 
teaching of law in a decolonised African context, with special reference to 
living customary law. The paper argues that the redesigning of the teaching 
of law – involving three elements – is critical to the decolonisation of law in 
Africa. The three elements are the inclusion of living customary law in legal 
education, a paradigm shift in legal theory, and the interdisciplinary study of 
law. Underpinning this argument are three important premises. The first 
premise is that decolonisation cannot be achieved without the development 
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of indigenous systems of law through legal education. In essence, the 
development and survival of living customary law cannot be divorced from 
the decolonisation of law in Africa. 
The second premise is that living customary law as a concept of law 
represents a move away from the colonial (and apartheid) heritage of the 
distortion of customary law. This makes this system of law the appropriate 
basis for, and object of, decolonisation of law in comparison with its 
counterpart, official customary law. The third premise is that living 
customary law has a distinctive character of its own, which requires special 
consideration for the purposes of teaching law in a decolonised context. 
In advancing the argument of this paper, we draw examples from the South 
African legal system because, on the African continent, it has the most 
advanced jurisprudential conceptualisation of customary law as both living 
customary law and official customary law. 
The argument of the paper is advanced in five sections. Following this 
introduction, the second section is a brief general background to the legality 
of protest action in tertiary institutions within the framework of the 
Constitution of South Africa. This section is intended to show that for the 
most part students were within their right to protest. The third section sets 
out the conceptual frameworks of decolonisation and customary law. The 
fourth section delves into the three elements of decolonisation – the 
teaching of living customary law, the theoretical paradigm within which law 
is taught, and interdisciplinary studies. The fifth section concludes the 
paper. 
2 The legal status of protest action in tertiary institutions 
The Supreme Court of Appeal pronounced itself on the legal status of 
protest action within the constitutional framework of South Africa in Hotz v 
UCT.3 This was an appeal from the High Court decision granting an interdict 
to the University of Cape Town barring five participants in one of the protest 
actions on the campus from entering the premises of the University because 
they had allegedly committed unlawful acts in the course of their protest. 
The Court held, inter alia,4 that protest action is not itself unlawful and that 
the right to protest against injustice is protected by the Constitution, "not 
only specifically in section 17, by way of the right to assemble, demonstrate 
and present petitions, but also by other constitutionally protected rights, 
such as the right of freedom of opinion (s15(1)); the right of freedom of 
                                            
3  Hotz v University of Cape Town 2017 2 SA 485 (SCA). 
4  Hotz v University of Cape Town 2017 2 SA 485 (SCA) paras 62-63. 
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expression (s16(1)); the right of freedom of association (s18) and the right 
to make political choices and campaign for a political cause (s19(1))".5 
However, the Court qualified these rights by holding that the mode of 
exercise of those rights is also the subject of constitutional regulation, that 
is: (a) the right to freedom of speech does not extend to the advocacy of 
hatred that is based on race or ethnicity and that constitutes incitement to 
cause harm (section 16(2)(c)); (b) the right to demonstrate is to be exercised 
peacefully and unarmed (section 17); and (c) all rights are to be exercised 
in a manner that respects and protects the foundational value of the human 
dignity of other people (section 10) and the rights other people enjoy under 
the Constitution. Citing its own decisions in other cases, the Court stated:6 
Our Constitution saw South Africa making a clean break with the past. The 
Constitution is focused on ensuring human dignity, the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. It is calculated 
to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. Public 
demonstrations and marches are a regular feature of present day South 
Africa. I accept that assemblies, pickets, marches and demonstrations are an 
essential feature of a democratic society and that they are essential 
instruments of dialogue in society. The [Regulation of Gatherings] Act was 
designed to ensure that public protests and demonstrations are confined 
within legally recognised limits with due regard for the rights of others. 
From this decision it may be inferred that protests in tertiary institutions are 
not to be treated any differently from other types of protest action in the 
country. Thus, although the actions of the appellants were restricted by an 
interdict, the right to lawful protest itself was unquestionable. 
This paper deals with protests within the scope of the law set out above. It 
is an attempt to discuss decolonisation under what Davis has called "an 
imperative to engage as to how tertiary institutions respond to locality and 
context".7  
3 The conceptual frameworks: decolonisation, living 
customary law and official customary law 
The definition of decolonisation is unsettled, if not contested. It is therefore 
important in a paper such as this one, which explores the idea of teaching 
law in a decolonised context, to proffer a definition within the limited scope 
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7  See Davis 2016 http://www.groundup.org.za/article/academics-and-fallist-
movement/. 
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of the teaching of law. This concept is discussed in this section along with 
the concepts of living customary law and official customary law. 
3.1 Decolonisation 
In this section we attempt to provide a definition of decolonisation that is 
relevant to the teaching of law in an African context. 
In their joint reflection on decolonising the University of Cape Town, Max 
Price and Russel Ally stated that "decolonisation … should certainly not be 
reduced to some naïve … desire to return to a pristine, unblemished Africa 
before the arrival of the settlers".8 We agree with this statement because it 
seems to allude to a non-romanticised and non-rhetorical concept of 
decolonisation, on the one hand, and a dynamic meaning of decolonisation, 
on the other hand. Elsewhere we define decolonisation in a legal context as 
follows: 
[W]hile indigenous approaches should, in our view, be central to the 
decolonisation of law, this is not a call for the unconditional indigenisation of 
law in which an anti-colonial discourse, which is frequently trapped within the 
same colonial epistemology, is advanced uncritically. Instead, we suggest that 
a more meaningful point of departure in the decolonisation of law is the 
defining of law from a "non-colonial" position and from alternative legal 
epistemologies. In this respect, decolonisation draws from different sources of 
law and normative agencies to promote the transformative potential of law in 
achieving more social and economic justice.9 
Decolonisation is, furthermore, a move from a hegemonic or 
Eurocentric conception of law connected to legal cultures historically 
rooted in colonialism (and apartheid) in Africa to more inclusive legal 
cultures.10 
We extend this notion of decolonisation to this paper. Additionally, 
decolonisation refers to locating the paradigmatic and theoretical shifts that 
are required for the teaching of law. 
3.2 Official customary law and living customary law 
Official customary law refers to a variety of sources of state law. In some 
countries, such as South Africa, official customary law may be divided into 
two categories for the purposes of this paper. The first category, the old 
order category, consists of codifications of customary law, such as the Zulu 
and Natal codes of customary law; legislation purporting to embody 
                                            
8  UCT 2015 Year in Review 23. 
9  This definition is derived from the IISLA proposal 4. See also Himonga (forthcoming 
2017) Acta Juridica. 
10  Himonga (forthcoming 2017) Acta Juridica. 
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customary law, such as the Black Administration Act;11 court precedents or 
case law; and textbooks whose content is based on legislation and court 
precedents or other state law sources of customary law. One or other kind 
of source in this category exists in most, if not all, former British colonies in 
Africa. 
The second category of official customary law, the new order official 
customary law, consists of legislation arising from the provisions of the 
Constitution that recognise customary law. For example, section 15 of the 
South African Constitution states that legislation may be enacted to 
recognise traditional forms of marriage or marriages concluded according 
to custom. Section 211(3) of the same Constitution provides that the courts 
must apply customary law subject to, among other things, legislation dealing 
specifically with customary law. In 1998, the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act was enacted to reform the customary law of marriage in line 
with the South African Constitution, including the constitutional provisions 
on gender equality. This Act makes provision for the application of both 
customary law and the common law.12 It is therefore a hybrid form of official 
customary law linked to new efforts aimed at transforming indigenous 
institutions within African constitutional frameworks.13 
Although both the old order and new order categories of official customary 
law bear the appellation of customary law, they often bear little resemblance 
to the living customary law regulating the day-to-day lives of people on the 
ground.14 Most importantly, the old order category of official customary law 
bears the marks of colonialism (and apartheid). This is because it was 
designed to advance colonial or apartheid state interests,15 in the process 
of which it was distorted. For these reasons, the inclusion of old order official 
customary law in legal education would perpetuate the colonial legal legacy, 
which is contrary to the idea of decolonisation. Therefore, this category of 
official customary law should not form a core part of the legal curriculum. In 
contrast, the new order official customary law should be included in legal 
education, because it forms part of the constitutionalisation of customary 
                                            
11  Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. This Act regulated several aspects of the lives 
of Black South Africans during the apartheid era, but it has now been largely 
repealed with the exception of a few provisions regulating the chiefs' and headmen's 
courts. 
12  For the purposes of this paper, the term "common law" is used in a broad sense to 
represent the body of law in Africa which arose from Eurocentric sources due to 
colonialism. No distinction is drawn between the families of legal systems, such as 
common law, civil law and mixed legal systems. 
13  The Reform of the Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters 
Act 11 of 2009, which came into operation on 20 September 2009, also falls in this 
category of official customary law. 
14  See generally Himonga and Moore Reform of Customary Marriage. 
15  See generally Chanock Law, Custom and Social Order. 
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law, along with living customary law, which is the focus of this paper as 
elaborated in the next section, where the concept of living customary law 
receives further consideration. 
4 Designing legal education for decolonisation 
Arguably, three elements are essential for decolonising law and legal 
education. These are the inclusion of living customary law in legal 
education, a shift in theoretical paradigm within which law is taught and the 
interdisciplinary study of law. A discussion of each of these elements 
follows. 
4.1 The inclusion of living customary law in legal education 
As intimated in the discussion of the conceptual framework above, living 
customary law is the law that governs the legal relations of people who are 
subject to a given system of customary law in their day-to-day life. An 
equally fitting definition is that adopted by South African legislation: "the 
customs and usages traditionally observed among the indigenous African 
peoples of South Africa which form part of the culture of those people".16 
The use of the term "culture" in this definition is significant, as it seems to 
allude to the dynamic nature of living customary law – as culture is dynamic, 
so is living customary law. Living customary law represents the practices or 
customs observed and invested with binding authority by the people whose 
customary law is under consideration.17 
Thus, living customary law is the law observed by, or rooted in, each ethnic 
group of Africa regardless of whether it is recognised by the state. As an 
unwritten store of legal ideas and knowledge, living customary law is passed 
down from one generation to the next orally. This store of knowledge is 
uniquely African in the sense that though not insulated from global 
conditions, its evolution is shaped within changing African social, economic 
and political contexts. Moreover, because of its oral nature and flexibility, 
living customary law can readily and easily be adjusted18 to meet the varied 
needs of justice in a decolonised context. 
That living customary law is distinct from other legal systems comprising 
African legal systems is clear from both academic literature and post-
                                            
16  Section 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and of the 
Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 
of 2009. 
17  See further Hund 1998 ARSP 420-429. 
18  Odgaard and Weis Benton 1998 EJDR 105. 
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apartheid jurisprudence in South Africa. In this respect, Bennett has 
observed: 
[R]ules of an oral regime are porous and malleable. Because they have no 
clear definition, it is difficult to differentiate one rule from another, and, in 
consequence, to classify rules according to type. If rules cannot be classified, 
they cannot be arranged into a system, and without the discipline of a system, 
rules may overlap and contradict one another. In fact strictly speaking, the oral 
versions of customary law should not be called systems at all. They are 
probably better described as repertoires, from which the discerning judge may 
select whichever rule best suits the needs of the case.19 
What emerges from this statement is a distinctive legal tradition whose logic 
and methodology does not place primary value on organisation or 
systemisation, and does not aspire to be a rigid framework of regulation, like 
other systems such as official customary law or the common law. 
Similarly, the Constitutional Court of South Africa implicitly describes living 
customary law20 as a distinctive and original source of law. Referring to the 
recognition of customary law by sections 211 and 39(2)21 of the Constitution, 
the Court stated: "The Constitution thus 'acknowledges the originality and 
distinctiveness of indigenous law as an independent source of norms within 
the legal system…'."22 
Arguably, the source of living customary law (ie the people subject to 
customary law), the value of its flexibility and adaptability as an evolving oral 
system, and its recognition as a distinctive and original source of indigenous 
law are all positive elements in the decolonisation of law. These attributes 
                                            
19  See Bennett Customary Law fn 6, p 3. 
20  In several cases, this court has recognised living customary law as a legitimate form 
of customary law in the post-apartheid legal system. See for example, the cases 
listed in note 22 below. 
21  Section 211 of Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states that: "(1) The 
institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are 
recognised subject to the Constitution. (2) A traditional authority that observes a 
system of customary law may function subject to any applicable legislation and 
customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those 
customs. (3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, 
subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary 
law"; section 39(2) provides that "When interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights". 
22  See Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). The quotation within this 
quotation is from another decision of the Constitutional Court, Alexkor Ltd v 
Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC) para 51. Also see Bhe v Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole; 
South African Human Rights Commission v President of the Republic of South Africa 
2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 41; Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: 
In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 
SA 744 (CC) para 197. 
C HIMONGA & F DIALLO  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  9 
also qualify this system of law for inclusion as a core subject of study in a 
decolonised system of legal education. Moreover, these qualities of living 
customary law justify its development and retention in a decolonised legal 
system, also bearing in mind the fact that this system of law regulates the 
lives of the majority of the population in African legal systems. 
Put differently, living customary law must be taught in all law faculties or law 
schools and at appropriate levels of the law degree that enable students to 
comprehend the significance and complexity of the subject within the 
constitutional frameworks of African countries. Future lawyers and judges 
need to have an understanding of important aspects of this customary law, 
including its conceptualisation, its methodology in a broad sense,23 and its 
development as a system of law within African constitutional frameworks. If 
future lawyers and judges are not given appropriate legal training about 
living customary law, they will not have the right lens24 through which to view 
customary law – in its own right and not from the perspective of other legal 
systems. The relevant pronouncements of the South African Constitutional 
Court above will therefore be devoid of any practical significance. 
The link between legal education and the development of a legal system is 
evident from the pronouncements of South African scholars about the 
development of Roman-Dutch law (RDL). In the words of Cowen, who we 
believe is one of the founders of legal education in South Africa, "taught law 
is tough law". With reference to the survival of RDL against the encroaching 
influence of English common law he stated: 
No legal system can survive unless it is taught scientifically … taught law is 
tough law by which [is meant] durable law. In short, the tide could not really 
turn in favour of the Roman-Dutch law in South Africa [in the nineteenth 
century] until a sound local tradition of tuition in its basic principles was built 
up … if I were asked to single out the cause which, more than any others, set 
back the prospects of the Roman-Dutch law in South Africa during much of 
the nineteenth century, I would point to the lack of scientific training in Roman-
Dutch law.25 
According to this statement, legal education was seen as the antidote to the 
eminent death of RDL due to the influence of other legal traditions or 
cultures. In our view, this statement is no less true of the survival of living 
                                            
23  For example, including case by case approaches and reconciliation as the goal of 
dispute resolution. 
24  Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC) para 51 where it stated: 
"While in the past indigenous law was seen through the common law lens, it must 
now be seen as an integral part of our law. Like all law it depends for its ultimate 
force and validity on the Constitution. Its validity must now be determined by 
reference not to common law, but to the Constitution." 
25  Cowen "Early Years of Aspiration to the 1920s" 8. See also Himonga 2010 Penn St 
Int'l L Rev 41-59 where Himonga first made this point. 
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customary law or any other indigenous system of law against the influence 
of imported, yet dominant colonial and apartheid legal systems. Unless 
customary law is taught in law faculties it will die. 
Furthermore, a host of issues concerning living customary law demand the 
attention of scientific thought in institutions of higher learning if this system 
is to develop into a modern African legal system. These issues include: (a) 
the long-standing challenge of how to ascertain living customary law, with 
the attendant question of how to ensure a measure of certainty about the 
rules of this system in the context of judicial decision-making; (b) the 
manipulation and distortion of living customary law, especially in the context 
of power relations among different sections of the community living under 
customary law and because of its evolving and oral nature;26 (c) appropriate 
methods of aligning this system of law with constitutional principles and 
international and regional human rights; (d) the endurance and social 
legitimacy of living customary law;27 and (e) issues of the universal 
application of human rights vis a vis cultural rights; and (f) whether and how 
the fundamentally different world views represented by the living customary 
law and common law can be merged and reconciled in one body of law - for 
example, that body of law which has to regulate commerce. We submit that 
there is no better place for addressing these issues, or for the development 
of customary law in relation to these issues, than in the academy, in legal 
education. 
In sum, we argue that the teaching of living customary law as part of the 
core curriculum of legal education is essential to the process of the 
decolonisation of law, as well as the decolonisation of legal education itself. 
In the next section we consider the importance of the legal theoretical 
paradigm within which law is taught to this process. 
                                            
26  See Chanock Law, Custom and Social Order 81; Kameri-Mbote, Odote and Nyamu-
Musembi Ours by Right 50. In Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha (Commission for 
Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights 
Commission v President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 
154, the minority judgment of Ngcobo J identified the issue of distortion of living 
customary law associated with this law's evolving and oral nature in the following 
terms: "The evolving nature of indigenous law and the fact that it is unwritten have 
resulted in the difficulty of ascertaining the true indigenous law as practiced in the 
community. …. What is more, abuses of indigenous law are at times construed as a 
true reflection of indigenous law, and these abuses tend to and undermine its value. 
The difficulty is one of identifying the living indigenous law and separating it from its 
distorted version."  
27  See, for example, Kane, Oloka-Onyango and Tejan-Cole 2005 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources
/reassessingcustomary.pdf. 
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4.2 The legal theoretical framework 
The predominant legal theoretical framework within which law is taught, at 
least in law schools under the historical influence of English and Roman-
Dutch common law is legal centralism and positivism. This theory prepares 
future lawyers and judges to engage with western-type legal systems and 
legal cultures and not with non-western African legal systems, let alone oral 
legal traditions. For example, an important aspect of legal positivism is 
formalism. This strand of legal theory separates legal rules from "nonlegal 
normative considerations of morality or political philosophy"28 and requires 
judges to apply the rules to the facts of the case before them deductively, 
with the value of legal certainty as a goal, among other things.29 However, 
the rules of living customary law cannot be abstracted from their social 
contexts. They are embedded in the social realities within which people live 
their lives. In addition, the values of certainty, stability and predictability – 
which are core to western legal cultures – are not necessarily the primary 
goals of dispute resolution in living customary law.30 
It is therefore arguable that the legal education of judges and lawyers in 
Africa exclusively within the theoretical frameworks of legal positivism and 
centralism do not adequately prepare them to deal with the application of 
non-western legal orders, such as living customary law, in which law and its 
values are viewed differently. The result is that lawyers and judges view 
living customary law as non-existent, or regard living customary law as 
informal law that is irrelevant to state institutions. 
South African judges, for example, have shown a remarkable willingness to 
step beyond the influence of the dominant mode of their legal education to 
embrace and recognise concepts of law, such as living customary law, that 
are located in non-western legal pluralistic theoretical frameworks. 
However, these judges sometimes seem to retreat into their predominantly 
western law and legal theoretical training and orientation when applying 
customary law. The result is that they bring ideas of legal centralism and 
positivism into the domain of customary law as well. 
A classic example of this retreat is the decision of the majority in Bhe v 
Magistrate Khayalitsha.31 In that case the Constitutional Court recognised 
the concept of living customary law, including its flexibility. This flexibility 
means that the system of law is relatively "processual", and hence less rule-
                                            
28  Leiter 2010 http://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325210000121 1. 
29  See generally Leiter 2010 http://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325210000121; Posner 
1986-7 Case W Res L Rev 179-217; Winerib 1988 Yale LJ 949-958. 
30  With regard to certainty, see Bennett Human Rights and African Customary Law 61; 
Himonga (forthcoming 2017) Acta Juridica. 
31  See note 26 above. 
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bound than the "positivist/centralist" system of law, in the sense that the 
application of the rules to disputes follows the repertoire of norms approach 
Bennett alludes to above.32. Inherently, this attribute of living customary law 
entails a case-by-case approach to the application of customary law in 
decision-making. It also entails some uncertainty in the outcomes of cases. 
In other words, ideally there is no precedent value in cases decided under 
customary law, as each case is decided entirely on its own merits.33 
Interestingly, however, the majority of judges in Bhe focused on the values 
of certainty and uniformity associated with legal centralism and positivism 
in deciding whether to develop customary law in accordance with 
constitutional provisions. The response of the Court to the argument on this 
issue is quoted at length in order to underscore this point. 
It was argued by one of the parties that if the Court was not in a position to 
develop the rules of customary law in this case, it should allow for flexibility 
in order to facilitate the development of the law. The majority, rejecting this 
argument, reasoned as follows: 
The import of this [argument] was that since customary law is inherently 
flexible with the ability to permit compromise settlements, courts should 
introduce into the system those principles that the official system of 
succession violates. It was suggested that this could be done by using the 
exceptions in the implementation of the primogeniture rule which do occur in 
the actual administration of intestate succession as the applicable rule for 
customary law succession in order to avoid unfair discrimination and the 
violation of the dignity of the individuals affected by it. These exceptions 
would, according to this view, constitute the "living" customary law which 
should be implemented instead of official customary law. …. There is much to 
be said for the above approach. I consider, however, that it would be 
inappropriate to adopt it as the remedy in this case. What it amounts to is 
advocacy for a case by case development as the best option. … The problem 
with development by the courts on a case by case basis is that changes will 
be very slow; uncertainties regarding the real rules of customary law will be 
prolonged and there will be different solutions for similar problems …34 
Arguably, underpinning this reasoning is the Court's support for the values 
of certainty and uniformity associated with the concept of law within the legal 
theoretical framework of centralism and positivism, as well as its affinity to 
the doctrine of precedent. Thus, the ghost of the training of judges in legal 
centralism and positivism sometimes seems to follow them when they apply 
                                            
32  See Bennett Customary Law fn 6, p 3. See also Himonga (forthcoming 2017) Acta 
Juridica. 
33  Himonga (forthcoming 2017) Acta Juridica. 
34  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); 
Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v President of the Republic 
of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) paras 110-112. Emphasis supplied. 
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customary law in decision-making.35 The training of lawyers and future 
judges should therefore equip them to deal not only with the dominant 
common-law systems of African countries but with living customary law as 
well. 
This shift could be made by teaching law within legal theoretical frameworks 
that are closely associated with the concept of living customary law, the 
most appropriate of which is the theoretical perspective of legal pluralism. 
Legal pluralism is the coexistence of distinctive legal systems in a specific 
social field where "laws and institutions are not subsumed within one system 
but have their sources in the self-regulatory activities of all the multifarious 
social fields present, activities which may support, complement, ignore or 
frustrate one another".36 Within this theoretical framework, the existence of 
one legal order does not depend on its recognition by other legal orders, 
including the legal order of the state. Living customary law fits perfectly into 
this theoretical framework.37 
Additionally, the sociological theoretical framework that deals with the 
concept of living law38 could also be explored for its relevance to the 
teaching of law in a decolonised context.39 
However, both the teaching of living customary law within the legal 
pluralistic (and sociological) theoretical framework and the decolonisation of 
law would benefit from an interdisciplinary approach to the teaching of law, 
to which we now turn. 
4.3 The interdisciplinary teaching of law 
An interdisciplinary approach to the study of a subject is defined as: 
[A]n approach that integrates information, data, techniques, tools, 
perspectives, concepts, and/or theories from two or more disciplines or bodies 
of specialised knowledge to advance fundamental understanding or to solve 
problems whose solutions are beyond the scope of a single discipline.40 
The National Science Foundation (NSF) in the USA has observed that the 
meaning of interdisciplinary studies is the subject of scholarly debates. It 
                                            
35  See, however, Himonga (forthcoming 2017) Acta Juridica for the view that the 
statement concerned may have been limited to the exceptional circumstances of the 
decision in Bhe. 
36  Griffiths 1986 J Legal Plur 39. 
37  For detailed discussion see Himonga and Bosch 2000 SALJ 306-341. 
38  See, for example, Ehrlich Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law. 
39  For a discussion of the conceptualisation of living customary law within a sociological 
theoretical framework, see Himonga and Bosch 2000 SALJ 306-341. 
40 The National Science Foundation in the USA (NSF) Date Unknown 
http://nsf.gov/od/oia/additional_resources/interdisciplinary_research/definition.jsp. 
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states that interdisciplinary studies are "continually emerging, melding and 
transforming".41 However, we submit that the dynamism of the 
interdisciplinary approach alluded to in this observation offers an interesting 
idea for the decolonisation of legal education. This is because dynamism 
represents the recognition of change and transformation which is needed to 
meld law with other disciplines continually, in order to enhance law's 
potential as an instrument of social justice. 
Interdisciplinary studies of law therefore offer a platform for a more profound 
understanding of the relationship between law in all its manifestations and 
regulatory practice in society. Law, as a social practice or legal science, has 
often closed itself off in epistemological monism. Yet, the apparent 
assumption underlying this monism that law can explain itself, both as 
theoretical corpus and social practice, cannot be established. Legal science 
therefore needs to open itself up to other disciplines through interdisciplinary 
studies. This is also essential to enhance the power of law to elucidate and 
transform social reality. Moreover, the problems that law is supposed to 
address in society often lie beyond a single discipline. Understanding the 
epistemological problems and sharpening the instrumentality of law in 
solving these problems therefore requires an integration of knowledge from 
different disciplines. 
The teaching and study of law in a decolonised context should aim to bring 
together contributions from various disciplines to focus on regulatory 
practices embodied by law in all its manifestations. A departure from pure 
legal studies is envisaged, in order to focus on conceptualising, developing, 
problematising and proposing hypotheses common to the various 
disciplines and interdisciplines involved, and to question and challenge legal 
approaches from these perspectives. For instance, as enabling disciplines, 
sociology, anthropology and history can enhance the understanding, 
teaching and research of legal phenomena in their various contextual 
manifestations in Africa. This in turn can be useful for exploring alternative 
epistemologies, hypotheses and methods that could lead to the rediscovery 
of legal studies via conceptual and methodological innovations. 
The proposed interdisciplinary positioning that connects legal science to 
other social sciences is especially important in the African context. Africa is 
characterised by plural legal systems, originating in colonial and, in South 
Africa, apartheid history, with their roots, definitions and structures in 
different legal traditions, frameworks and paradigms. Moreover, as the 
recent protests for free education and debates on transformation in some 
universities in South Africa have reminded the academic community, 
teaching and research agendas cannot remain unresponsive to social and 
legal plurality. Neither can they continue to be indifferent to the colonial and 
apartheid history and its influence on the current evolution of South Africa's 
                                            
41  NSF Date Unknown http://nsf.gov/od/oia/additional_resources/interdisciplinary_ 
research/definition.jsp. 
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legal traditions and social, economic and political systems. In this respect, 
we argue that the teaching of law should take a view of decolonisation of 
law that goes further than mere vernacularisation. This argument is 
informed by law's capacity to facilitate interdisciplinary and innovative 
thinking, as well as to create a platform to engage, in a critical and 
constructive way, with the decolonisation of law as an epistemological 
question beyond its political and social implications. 
More specifically, interdisciplinary studies in the fields of law and 
anthropology, law and sociology, and law and history would introduce 
students and the legal profession to a way of understanding social realities 
that is gleaned from the lived experiences of people. This would be achieved 
through the multiple layers of observing, interviewing, translating, writing 
and interpreting (asking questions such as how to capture and understand 
the norms of a community, how to understand a community or ethnic group 
etc.), as well as through understanding of how legitimacy and authority are 
multi-vocal and often contested.42 Furthermore, studies in these fields would 
help law students and the legal profession generally to better understand 
issues concerning inequality, modes of oppression, and social justice.43 
Studies in law and history in particular would assist students to understand 
the neglect of the study of living customary law in African colonial (and 
apartheid) history, as well as the need for a paradigm shift in the thinking 
about customary law as a source of law in post-colonial contexts exhibiting 
new constitutional mandates regarding the recognition of customary law in 
the legal system. 
Finally, interdisciplinary studies may be useful where students are required 
to understand a given subject in terms of multiple traditional disciplines.44 
As stated above, the connection of legal science to other social sciences is 
important in legal settings characterised by pluralism, and because the 
problems that law is supposed to address in society often lie beyond a single 
discipline. 
In sum, the teaching of law, particularly living customary law, should 
incorporate an interdisciplinary approach, in order to expand the depth and 
quality of legal studies, and to build an academic community knowledgeable 
about the relevance of other disciplines for law and vice versa. The current 
teaching of law as a discipline does not generally equip graduates with 
these broad-based skills. This deficiency reduces their ability to study and 
research living customary law and to contribute more effectively to the 
development of this law as a discipline. Similar deficiencies reduce the 
                                            
42  Dr Elena Moore (oral exchange - 24 May 16). 
43  Dr Elena Moore (oral exchange - 24 May 16). 
44  Ponnusamy and Pandurangan Hand Book on University System 13. 
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ability of graduates to deal with customary law within the constitutional 
mandates of decision-making in the adjudication of disputes. 
5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the paper has attempted to link the decolonisation of law in 
Africa to the teaching and survival of living customary law as a distinct legal 
system which regulates the lives of millions of people in Africa. This not only 
reflects African legal realities, but also contributes to alternative 
epistemologies that reveal the transformative potential of law in dealing with 
the social realities of Africa. In this paper we have argued that the teaching 
of living customary law and law generally is critical to both of these 
contributions. The paper has also argued that unless law teaching is 
redesigned to shift the legal theoretical paradigm within which law is taught 
and to adopt an interdisciplinary approach to the teaching of law, the project 
of decolonising law in African legal systems will falter if not fail to materialise. 
We have also attempted to show that the overall shift in the paradigm of 
teaching law will increase the potential of law to transform African societies 
and enhance social justice in a manner that is consistent with 
decolonisation. 
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